INTRODUCTION We feature a series of model portfolios with the intention
of providing practical guidance for readers. It is updated and published quarterly.
The core portfolios are Global Equities, Global Bonds and Global Emerging Markets.
In each of these we show the FP Model Portfolios compared with major
benchmark indices and an average of the positions of the leading fund managers.
Whilst we indicate specific percentage weightings, these
should be used as broad guides and readers may wish to manage portfolios in a practical
sense by considering exposure in terms of "ranges".
We divide the world into two broad groupings:
- Developed Markets include North America, Japan, Continental Europe and
the UK
- Emerging Markets are featured on a regional basis to include South East
Asia, Latin America and Emerging Europe, Africa & Middle East.
We also specify a number of portfolio variations based
upon the core portfolios noted above. These include a series of Balanced Portfolios, a Positive Growth Portfolio
and Currency Tilted Portfolios
for Sterling, US Dollar and European investors who wish to retain a heavy proportion of
their assets in their base currency. These portfolios are described from pure equity and
balanced portfolio perspectives.
Last but not least we also feature performance information showing
the results achieved. Please note, however, that the performance information is usually
updated 1 month after release/publication of the asset allocation models.
GLOBAL EQUITY PORTFOLIO
|
FP Model
% |
MSCI
% |
Average Manager
% |
Developed Markets |
|
|
|
North America |
50.0 |
(42.5) |
52.2 |
37.8 |
(36.4) |
Japan |
5.0 |
(5.0) |
10.0 |
8.7 |
(9.1) |
Europe |
25.0 |
(32.5) |
25.1 |
29.0 |
(29.6) |
UK |
15.0 |
(10.0) |
11.2 |
14.1 |
(14.0) |
|
95.0 |
(90.0) |
98.5 |
89.6 |
(89.1) |
Emerging Markets |
|
|
|
|
|
South East Asia |
5.0 |
(0.0) |
1.2 |
2.4 |
(3.5) |
Latin America |
5.0 |
(5.0) |
0.0 |
1.4 |
(2.3) |
Emerging Europe, Africa & Middle East |
5.0 |
(5.0) |
0.3 |
0.6 |
(0.5) |
|
5.0 |
(10.0) |
1.5 |
4.4 |
(6.3) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Cash |
0.0 |
(0.0) |
0.0 |
6.0 |
(4.6) |
|
100.0 |
|
100.0 |
100.0 |
|
Comment:
As noted later in our Global Review, we are not
particularly well disposed to equity markets, at least in the near term. We would remind
readers that the Global Equity Portfolio shown above will always be a fully invested model
and, whilst we do not like equity markets, the weightings shown above provide a focus on
the markets we dislike the least.
We believe that the safest haven will be the United States although we
do expect a sell off from the current level of 7800 on the Dow Jones Index. Accordingly,
we have boosted our weighting from 42.5% to 50%, moving almost in line with an MSCI
neutral position. We retain our 5% Japanese exposure but we feel that the prospects for
the UK are better than Continental Europe. Hence, we have cut the European weighting and
boosted the UK. We have made a further cut in the Emerging Markets weighting and, now that
this represents only 5% of the model, we would recommend that exposure be achieved through
a global fund rather than through regional funds.
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OF PAGE
GLOBAL BOND PORTFOLIO
|
FP Model
% |
Salomon World Gov. Bond |
Average Manager
% |
Dollar Bloc |
|
|
|
United States |
55.0 |
(50.0) |
33.5 |
41.7 |
(40.8) |
Canada |
0.0 |
(0.0) |
3.4 |
2.3 |
(1.2) |
Australia |
0.0 |
(0.0) |
0.9 |
1.2 |
(1.7) |
|
55.0 |
(50.0) |
37.8 |
45.2 |
(43.7) |
Japan |
0.0 |
(0.0) |
19.1 |
2.2 |
(3.3) |
European Bloc |
|
|
|
|
|
Continental Europe |
12.5 |
(10.0) |
36.6 |
34.5 |
(32.3) |
UK |
22.5 |
(20.0) |
6.5 |
10.5 |
(11.5) |
Other/Emerging |
10.0 |
(20.0) |
0.0 |
2.7 |
(2.9) |
Cash |
|
|
0.0 |
4.9 |
(5.3) |
|
100.0 |
|
100.0 |
100.0 |
|
Comment:
As noted later in our Global Review, we strongly prefer bonds
over equities at present. With hindsight, our overweight position in emerging market bonds
did us no favours in the last quarter. Going forward, particularly after the sell off and
with yield spreads having widened significantly, we still retain a weighting although a
more cautious one. As the prospects of reducing interest rates on a global basis are good,
we have boosted our weightings in the core areas of the US, the UK and Continental Europe.
Favoured currencies are found in countries with current accounts surpluses. We note that
the global bond managers are actively managing currency exposure at present with the
Deutschemark bloc currently being favoured.
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GLOBAL EMERGING MARKETS
PORTFOLIO
|
FP Model
% |
MSCI
% |
Average Manager
(AA.12)
% |
Developed Markets |
|
|
|
South East Asia |
25.0 |
(0.0) |
31.6 |
19.8 |
(20.0) |
Latin America |
25.0 |
(50.0) |
38.5 |
31.8 |
(36.1) |
Emerging Europe, Africa & Middle East |
50.0 |
(50.0) |
29.9 |
33.5 |
(36.6) |
Other |
0.0 |
(0.0) |
0.0 |
3.9 |
(3.3) |
Cash |
0.0 |
(0.0) |
0.0 |
11.0 |
(3.9) |
|
100.0 |
|
100.0 |
100.0 |
|
Comment:
There was certainly nowhere to hide in the last
quarter in the Emerging Markets. Over the last year we have seen across the board falls in
South East Asia, Latin America and Emerging Europe with the Russian influence having a
major impact on the Eastern European markets. The Russian crisis also had a global impact
and was perhaps the catalyst in awakening investors to the excesses in markets.
Going forward, the immediate issue is the problem in
Brazil and the likely spin off effects into the rest of Latin America and the US. Our
Global Emerging Markets Portfolio reflects this and we have reduced the Latin America
weighting to 25%. We now reintroduce Asia at 25% of assets. We believe that the downside
is limited but that immediate prospects for solid returns are not significant. Generally,
as an asset class, we remain very cautious on emerging markets globally.
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BALANCED PORTFOLIOS
|
|
FP Model (i)
% |
FP Model (ii)
% |
FP Model (iii)
% |
Equities: |
North America |
29.8 |
(29.8) |
21.3 |
(21.3) |
12.8 |
(12.8) |
|
Japan |
3.5 |
(3.5) |
2.5 |
(2.5) |
1.5 |
(1.5) |
|
Europe |
22.8 |
(22.8) |
16.3 |
(16.3) |
9.8 |
(9.8) |
|
UK |
7.0 |
(7.0) |
5.0 |
(5.0) |
3.0 |
(3.0) |
|
South East Asia |
0.0 |
(0.0) |
0.0 |
(0.0) |
0.0 |
(0.0) |
|
Latin America |
3.5 |
(3.5) |
2.5 |
(2.5) |
1.5 |
(1.5) |
|
Emerging Europe, Africa & Middle East |
3.5 |
(3.5) |
2.5 |
(2.5) |
1.5 |
(1.5) |
|
|
70.0 |
(70.0) |
50.0 |
(50.0) |
30.0 |
(30.0) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Bonds: |
Dollar Bloc |
15.0 |
(15.0) |
25.0 |
(25.0) |
35.0 |
(35.0) |
|
Japan |
0.0 |
(0.0) |
0.0 |
(0.0) |
0.0 |
(0.0) |
|
Europe |
3.0 |
(3.0) |
5.0 |
(5.0) |
7.0 |
(7.0) |
|
UK |
6.0 |
(6.0) |
10.0 |
(10.0) |
14.0 |
(14.0) |
|
Emerging Markets |
6.0 |
(6.0) |
10.0 |
(10.0) |
14.0 |
(14.0) |
|
|
30.0 |
(30.0) |
50.0 |
(50.0) |
70.0 |
(70.0) |
Comment:
The Balanced Portfolios have been constructed
under three scenarios 70/30 equity/bond, 50/50 equity/bond and 30/70 equity/bond.
The purpose of providing three scenarios is to enable readers to choose the most
appropriate model to select specific client risk profiles. The composition of the models
flows directly from the Global Equity Portfolio and the Global Bond Portfolio. The figures
show Q3 1998 weightings in parenthesis.
TOP OF PAGE
POSITIVE EQUITY GROWTH
PORTFOLIO
|
|
FP Model
% |
Developed Markets: |
North America |
26.3 |
(24.2) |
|
Japan |
2.6 |
(2.9) |
|
Europe |
13.2 |
(17.2) |
|
UK |
7.9 |
(5.7) |
|
|
50.0 |
(50.0) |
|
|
|
|
Emerging Markets: |
South East Asia |
12.5 |
(0.0) |
|
Latin America |
12.5 |
(25.0) |
|
Emerging Europe, Africa & Middle East |
25.0 |
(25.0) |
|
|
50.0 |
(50.0) |
|
|
100.0 |
|
Comment:
The Positive Equity Growth Portfolio is intended for investors
who wish to take a long term (5+ years) view. Over this time horizon we believe that it is
reasonable to expect that equities will outperform bonds and that emerging markets should
outperform developed markets although higher volatility levels will feature in the former.
The composition of the models flows directly from the Global Equity Portfolio and the
Global Emerging Markets Portfolio. The figures show Q3 1998 weightings in parenthesis.
TOP OF PAGE
CURRENCY TILTED PORTFOLIOS
|
|
Sterling Tilt
% |
US Dollar Tilt
% |
European Tilt
% |
Equity Only: |
North America |
25.0 |
(21.3) |
75.0 |
(71.3) |
25.0 |
(21.3) |
|
Japan |
2.5 |
(2.5) |
2.5 |
(2.5) |
2.5 |
(2.5) |
|
Europe |
12.5 |
(16.3) |
12.5 |
(16.3) |
62.5 |
(66.3) |
|
UK |
57.5 |
(55.0) |
7.5 |
(5.0) |
7.5 |
(5.0) |
|
South East Asia |
0.6 |
(0.0) |
0.6 |
(0.0) |
0.6 |
(0.0) |
|
Latin America |
0.6 |
(2.5) |
0.6 |
(2.5) |
0.6 |
(2.5) |
|
Emerging Europe, Africa & Middle East |
1.3 |
(2.5) |
1.3 |
(2.5) |
1.3 |
(2.5) |
|
|
100.0 |
(100.0) |
100.0 |
(100.0) |
100.0 |
(100.0) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Balanced: |
Base Currency Equities |
28.8 |
(27.5) |
37.5 |
(35.6) |
31.3 |
(33.1) |
50:50 |
Other Equities |
21.3 |
(22.5) |
12.5 |
(14.4) |
18.8 |
(16.9) |
|
Base Currency Bonds |
30.6 |
(30.0) |
38.8 |
(37.5) |
28.1 |
(27.5) |
|
Other Bonds |
19.4 |
(20.0) |
11.3 |
(12.5) |
21.9 |
(22.5) |
|
|
100.0 |
(100.0) |
100.0 |
(100.0) |
100.0 |
(100.0) |
Comment:
The currency tilted portfolios recognise that
many investors prefer to have a substantial proportion of their assets held in their home
currency or country. The "Equity Only" portfolio above is constructed from the
Global Equity Model. However, the figures reflect a 50% weighting in the home equity
market before the Global Equity Model is applied. For example, in the US Dollar tilted
model, the 75% weighting in US equities comprises a core weighting of 50% together with
50% of the 50% US exposure in the Global Equity Model.
The same principles are applied in structuring the
"Balanced 50:50" portfolio. The method of determining the equity element is the
same as that on the "Equity Only" portfolio. The bond content also follows the
same principle, with a 50% weighting in the home bond market before the core Global Bond
Model is applied.
We are showing in parenthesis the figures for Q3 1998.
TOP OF PAGE
GLOBAL OVERVIEW
We continue to feature a Global Equity Portfolio, a
Global Bond Portfolio and a Global Emerging Markets Portfolio as set out in schedules AA.1
- AA.3 of this document. In these core modules, we cannot clearly indicate any preference
which we have towards a particular asset class. Our own disciplines dictate that we remain
fully invested in the asset classes featured in the model portfolios.
In the case of the Equity portfolio, whilst we are
concerned about the markets, we must be fully invested and have, therefore, taken what we
believe to be a very cautious approach, one of emphasising the more liquid and developed
US and UK markets at the expense of others. Balanced portfolios become much more important
in difficult times like we are seeing at present.
Presently, we would tend to favour the most conservative
of the Balanced Portfolios and would even probably go further in de-emphasising equities
at the expense of bonds. It is too big a risk to exclude equities completely but in the
short term we would strongly recommend a heavy bias towards bonds and cash. We have
recently taken the view that the equity risk premium has risen substantially on a global
basis and we now recommend a move in favour of bonds and cash as better investments in
both relative and absolute terms.
It is easy to be a bear and many individuals have been
late in arriving at the conclusion that the outlook is depressing but the trend is now
firmly in place with only the US investor showing any meaningful resistance. AA.12 sets
out a comparison of the events of 1929 with those of today. Gloom merchants emphasise the
parallels but the background is different. Nevertheless, we anticipate a further fall in
equity prices as the deleveraging process continues and investors flee from risk. Any
asset which is overloved tends to falter and gains will be eroded where excesses are in
evidence.
The levels of volatility which currently exist will only
encourage investor inertia and we are acutely aware of the fact that most of the fund
management groups to which we speak regularly are seeing, at best, no new inflows and, at
worst, net outflows. The tide of liquidity has turned and is unlikely to return in the
short term. Alan Greenspan and the US economy cannot bail out the world economy with
interest rate cuts. Witness Japan, where effectively zero interest rates now act as a
deterrent to the investor. The issues in Japan and core Europe are structural and will not
be fixed by short term monetary easing. We are also concerned that the Euro is
increasingly vulnerable as growth in Europe slows. At the extreme, even a realignment or a
postponement could now be considered possible.
However, we cannot give credence to those bears who have
joined the party and now predict the end of the world. The capitalist system remains in
tact but remains vulnerable to excesses and declines. The scale of the downturn is
becoming meaningful and we are approaching levels of valuations in selected markets that
are appealing to the long-term investor. Bonds are still favoured, as inflation at the top
of the cycle has remained muted and can be expected to fall as economic activity slows.
Real yields have scope to fall even from these levels.
As noted earlier, we continue to favour the US, the UK
and the European equity markets, in that order, but acknowledge that the US market is yet
to make any significant move on the downside. Such a downward move would almost certainly
lead to further falls in Europe. Timing is a major issue for most investors and we would
argue that the balance of the year holds significant risks in relation to the potential
rewards. As far as emerging markets are concerned, there will be opportunities for
investors to make gains in the future. At this time of maximum pessimism, with liquidity
squeezed, currencies under pressure and the politics looking awful, we need to be alert to
any change in sentiment or fundamentals.
Our discussions with fund managers generally supports
our contentions. Caution is the by-word. Undoubtedly, we may see markets bounce from these
levels, but we should take care not to have a false sense of security under those
circumstances. Our conclusion is that professional investors should overweight bonds and
cash at the expense of equities. Equity portfolios should only focus on quality managers
with an emphasis on blue chip shares.
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LESSONS FROM HISTORY
OBSERVATION |
1929 |
1998 |
Financial restrictions. |
Gold Standard. |
Conservative Central Banks
and Pegged currency regimes. |
Central banks were
addressing the wrong objectives. |
The Fed needed to establish
its credibility and was too hawkish. |
The ECB has expressed
similar intentions |
Similar beginnings. |
The crisis began with
isolated domestic problems in Austria and Hungary, which were completely different but at
the end led to the same result devaluation and default. In the case of Austria, the
crisis began with the collapse of Vienna Creditanstalt, which the Government rescued thus,
transforming a banking crisis into a fiscal crisis (The Japanese Saga). In Hungary,
however, the crisis began as a fiscal crisis (the Government borrowed to subsidise
domestic grain producers) and ended as a full-blown banking crisis. |
Now all Emerging markets
have either had a banking crisis or have experienced a fiscal weakness. The end result,
however has been a significant risk of devaluation and default. |
Psychological
repercussions. |
A move away from free
market economics towards protectionism, Fascism and central planning. A move away from
globalisation and the free movement of people and capital. |
Malaysia, Hong Kong, Japan,
Russia.... |
Commodity markets. |
Commodity prices weakened
substantially and lagged the global economic recovery for a number of years. |
Commodity prices have been
on a downward path for a number of months. |
Over-investment with
disregard for Risk. |
Weaker banking systems
invested in high yielding markets and instruments for short-term gains with the hope of
solidifying their already vulnerable positions. |
South Korean and Brazilian
Banks were the biggest holders of Russian GKOs (domestic short-term debt). Japanese banks
are the biggest lenders / investors in South East Asian economies. |
Domino effect. |
The crisis spreads to
Germany only because of its proximity to the affected countries, Austria and Hungary, and
then to the rest of the world. |
The problem affected all
emerging countries with a similar level of economic development and, of late, sectors with
the highest exposure to those countries.
Who will be next? |
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OF PAGE
PERFORMANCE REVIEW
This Performance Review for the Period Up to 31st March 1998
|
FP Model
Performance
% |
Index
Performance
% |
Average Manager
Performance
% |
Global Equity Model |
14.80 |
13.20 |
12.50 |
Global Bond Model |
1.84 |
1.80 |
1.30 |
Global Emerging Markets Model |
3.22 |
7.20 |
4.60 |
Balanced Portfolios |
|
|
|
70:30 Equity: Bond |
10.91 |
9.78 |
9.14 |
50:50 Equity: Bond |
8.32 |
7.50 |
6.90 |
30:70 Equity: Bond |
5.73 |
5.22 |
4.66 |
Positive Equity Growth Portfolio |
9.01 |
10.20 |
8.55 |
Notes:
- All figures calculated in US Dollars on a bid to bid basis with gross
income reinvested.
- Indices used are MSCI World, Salomon World Government Bond and MSCI
Emerging World Index.
- Performance data extracted for Hindsight; other calculations prepared by
Forsyth Partners.
- Figures calculated 1st January 1998 to 31st March
1998.
- FP Model
performance calculations are based on funds recommended for
the first three months of 1998 on an equally weighted basis on specific recommendations by
market as featured in this Asset Allocation Review.
- Index
performance calculations are based on: (i) in the case of
equities, MSCI weightings adjusted for the performance of the domestic MSCI Index in the
relevant market and (ii) in the case of bonds, Salomon World Government Bond Index
performance.
- Average Manager
performance calculations are based on the Average
Manager weightings at the beginning of each quarter, with the appropriate domestic MSCI or
Salomon World Government Bond Index movement applied to these weightings.
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This document is issued by Forsyth Partners Limited, which
is regulated in the conduct of investment business by IMRO. This extract from their
research should be read in conjunction with the Methodology and Background Notes Module
which forms part of the Research Manual which is published by Forsyth Partners Limited and
is available on subscription and, in particular, attention is drawn to the emerging market
risks warnings contained therein. The price of shares/units and the income from them can
fall as well as rise and the value of an investment can vary upwards or downwards
depending on exchange rate movements. © Forsyth Partners Limited FORSYTH PARTNERS
LTD, 18 BARCLAY ROAD, CROYDON, CRO 1JN UK.
Tel: +44 181 649 9440/Fax: + 44 181 649 9441 |